The Theory of Monetary Institutions

List of Figures and Tables.
<p>Preface.</p>
<p>Acknowledgments.</p>
<p>Part 1: The Evolution of Market Monetary Institutions:.</p>
<p>The Mystery of Money.</p>
<p>Menger′s Theory Restated.</p>
<p>Some Implications of the Theory.</p>
<p>From Simple Commodity Money to Coins.</p>
<p>Bank–Issued Money.</p>
<p>Regular Par Acceptance.</p>
<p>Clearing Arrangements.</p>
<p>The Path to Fiat Money.</p>
<p>Spontaneous Separation Between the Media of Redemption and Account?.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part II: Commodity Money:.</p>
<p>Determining the Price Level.</p>
<p>The Simple Stock–Flow Analytics of Gold Supply and Demand.</p>
<p>The Historical Sources of Gold Supply Disturbances.</p>
<p>The Benefits of a Gold Standard.</p>
<p>The Resource Costs of a Gold Standard.</p>
<p>Is a Gold Standard Worth the Resource Cost?.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part III: Money Issue by Unrestricted Banks:.</p>
<p>The Purchasing Power of Money.</p>
<p>Bank Optimization and the Equilibrium Quantity of Bank–Issued Money.</p>
<p>Correcting Over–Issue by an Individual Bank.</p>
<p>Correcting Over–Issue by the System as a Whole.</p>
<p>Responding to Shifts in Demand.</p>
<p>Shifts Between Deposits and Currency.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part IV: The Evolution and Rationales of Central Banking:.</p>
<p>Central Banking Roles and Clearinghouse Associations.</p>
<p>The Origins of Government Central Banks.</p>
<p>Historical Cases.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part V: Should Government Play a Role in Money?.</p>
<p>Is Some Aspect of Money a Public Good?.</p>
<p>Are There Relevant External Benefits in the Choice of Which Money to Use?.</p>
<p>Are There Relevant External Benefits to the Choice of How Much Money to Hold?.</p>
<p>iv. Is the Supply of Base Money a Natural Monopoly?.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part VI: Should Government Play a Role in Banking? .</p>
<p>The Problem of Bank Runs.</p>
<p>Inherent Vulnerability in Theory: The Diamond–Dybvig Model.</p>
<p>The Fragility of the Diamond–Dybvig Bank: A Numerical Example.</p>
<p>Deposit Insurance in the Diamond–Dybvig Model.</p>
<p>Criticism of the Diamond–Dybvig Model.</p>
<p>Are Deposit Contracts Inherently Fragile?.</p>
<p>Historical Evidence on Inherent Vulnerability.</p>
<p>Is There a Natural Monopoly in Bank–Issued Money?.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part VII: Seigniorage:.</p>
<p>The Sources of Seigniorage.</p>
<p>Maximizing the Take from Seigniorage.</p>
<p>Reserve Requirements.</p>
<p>Other Legal Restrictions.</p>
<p>The Dynamics of Hyperinflation.</p>
<p>The Transition Between Steady States: Is Honesty a Government′s Best Policy?.</p>
<p>How Well Does Seigniorage Explain Actual Governments′ Behavior?.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Appendix.</p>
<p>Part VIII: Central Bank as Bureaucracy:.</p>
<p>Bureaucratic Explanation of the Fed′s Operating Procedures.</p>
<p>Bureaucracy and "inflationary bias".</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part IX: Political Business Cycle Hypotheses:.</p>
<p>The Nordhaus–MacRae Model.</p>
<p>The Rational Expectations Critique.</p>
<p>An Alternative Formulation: Wagner′s Political Seigniorage Cycle.</p>
<p>The "Partisan" Political Business Cycle Theory.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part X: Discretion and Dynamic Inconsistency:.</p>
<p>The Kydland–Prescott Model.</p>
<p>Positive Implications: Using the Model to Explain Changes in Inflation.</p>
<p>Policy Implications Under Discretion.</p>
<p>Rules Versus Discretion.</p>
<p>Subsequent Literature.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Appendix.</p>
<p>Part XI: Monetary Rules:.</p>
<p>Benefits and Burdens of Counter–Cyclical Policy.</p>
<p>Independence for the Central Bank.</p>
<p>Arguments for Rules.</p>
<p>Friedman′s Proposals.</p>
<p>McCallum′s Case for a Feedback Rule.</p>
<p>Simple Versus Complicated Rules.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part XII: Competitive Supply of Fiat–Type Money:.</p>
<p>i. Klein′s Model with Perfect Foresight.</p>
<p>ii. Klein′s Model with "Imperfect Foresight".</p>
<p>Is the Equilibrium Rate of Inflation Bounded under Imperfect Foresight?.</p>
<p>Conclusion.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>Part XIII: Cashless Competitive Payments and Legal Restrictions:.</p>
<p>The Greenfield–Yeager Proposal.</p>
<p>Is Bundles–Worth Redemption Workable?.</p>
<p>Other Concerns About the GY Proposal.</p>
<p>The Legal Restrictions Theory.</p>
<p>Historical Evidence on the Non–Coexistence Prediction.</p>
<p>Questions.</p>
<p>References.</p>
<p>Index.</p>